By José Juan Moreso, Pablo E. Navarro, Cristina Redondo
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Countering the influential view of severe criminal experiences that legislation is an incoherent mix of conflicting political ideologies, this ebook forges a new paradigm for realizing the typical legislations as being unified and systematic. Alan Brudner applies Hegel's criminal and ethical philosophy to style a accomplished synthesis of the typical legislation of estate, agreement, tort, and crime.
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79; Dig. 7). The Proculians held that the new thing belonged to A, the maker; the Sabinians that it belonged to B, the owner of the material (Wieacker 1954). The differ- CHAPTER 1 - ROMAN CONCEPTION OF LAW 15 ence of opinion has sometimes been attributed to a difference in philosophical approach. Aristotelians would have said that the maker of the thing gave it its form, whereas the Stoics, emphasizing its nature, would have said that its substance was the material of which it was made. Probably the Proculians’ decision was the result of their insistence that the plaintiff in the vindicatio action, by which one claimed ownership of a thing, had to give a precise description of what he was claiming.
When the empire became Christian in the fourth century, very little change in the civil law was needed to accommodate the new orthodoxy. 1. Foreword Whereas the Roman jurists of Antiquity, in line with the pragmatism of their law, were not inclined to address complex questions of natural philosophy, the glossators and commentators of late medieval jurisprudence displayed a radically different attitude. In doing so, they implemented a change of greatest importance in the history of juridical thought.
As an example, he cited the case where several persons, intending to steal, carry off a timber beam, belonging to another, which (was so heavy that) none of them could have carried it off by himself. They are all liable for theft, although by subtle reasoning (subtili ratione) it could be argued that none of them is liable, because no one person actually removed the beam. The contrasting attitudes of the schools grew less marked in the second half of the second century and then disappeared. The leading jurists of the early third century seem to combine in their work elements of the thought of 16 TREATISE, 7 - FROM ROME TO THE SEVENTEENTH CENTURY both schools.
Conocimiento jurídico y determinación normativa by José Juan Moreso, Pablo E. Navarro, Cristina Redondo